Analyzing a networked social algorithm for collective selection of representative committees by Hernández, Alexis R. et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Analyzing a networked social algorithm for
collective selection of representative
committees
Alexis R. Herna´ndezID1*, Carlos Gracia-La´zaro2, Edgardo Brigatti1, Yamir Moreno2,3,4
1 Instituto de Fı´sica, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2 Institute for
Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain,
3 Department of Theoretical Physics, Faculty of Sciences, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain, 4 ISI
Foundation, Turin, Italy
* elchechi@gmail.com
Abstract
A recent work (Herna´ndez, et al., 2018) introduced a networked voting rule supported by a
trust-based social network, where indications of possible representatives were based on
individuals opinions. Individual contributions went beyond a simple vote-counting and were
based on proxy voting. This mechanism selects committees with high levels of representa-
tiveness, weakening the possibility of patronage relations. By incorporating the integrity of
individuals and its perception, we here address the question of the resulting committee’s
trustability. Our results show that this voting rule provides sufficiently small committees with
high levels of representativeness and integrity. Furthermore, the voting system displays
robustness to strategic and untruthful application of the voting algorithm.
Introduction
The form of citizen participation in contemporary and complex democracies is a central issue
in social debate. Many transformations and possible innovations have been recently discussed
[2–4], which redesign our interactions in politics and society, often forced by the widespread
use of digital technologies. A general problem, which ranges from national to neighborhood
scales, is the problem of selecting an exemplary group of representatives to make decisions on
behalf of the community [5–7].
Despite the prolific theoretical and philosophical debate over these issues [8, 9], examples of
empirical construction of new algorithms have been relatively limited [1, 10–12]. Recently,
Hernandez et al. introduced a new social algorithm for collective selection of a committee of
representatives [1]. The algorithm is developed starting from a standard situation where each
voter is allowed to vote for only one candidate. However, the elected representatives are the
ones who obtain a better rank among their counterparts, in a way that individual contributions
go far beyond a simple vote-counting.
The introduced formal algorithm presents new specific features which could improve gov-
ernance legitimation and fairness. The lists of candidates are not fixed in advance, but they
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945 September 26, 2019 1 / 13
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Herna´ndez AR, Gracia-La´zaro C, Brigatti
E, Moreno Y (2019) Analyzing a networked social
algorithm for collective selection of representative
committees. PLoS ONE 14(9): e0222945. https://
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945
Editor: Ginestra Bianconi, Queen Mary University
of London, UNITED KINGDOM
Received: June 3, 2019
Accepted: September 10, 2019
Published: September 26, 2019
Peer Review History: PLOS recognizes the
benefits of transparency in the peer review
process; therefore, we enable the publication of
all of the content of peer review and author
responses alongside final, published articles. The
editorial history of this article is available here:
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945
Copyright: © 2019 Herna´ndez et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the manuscript and its Supporting
Information files.
Funding: C. G-L and Y.M. acknowledge
partial support from the Government of Arago´n,
emerge as a self-organized process controlled by the voting rules. This fact introduces an effec-
tive participation and engagement of the whole community, in contrast to top-down candidate
rigid lists. The voters express not preferences, but opinions, which determine their indications
about whom they would like to see as their representatives. Finally, the new proposed mecha-
nism improves the committee representativeness, weakening the possibility of patronage and
clientelism relations. Additionally, the vote aggregation mechanism is supported by a self-
declared confidence circle, which defines a network of trusted individuals. This trust-based
social network, which can be implemented on an online platform, is a fundamental ingredient
that allows for direct accountability of the elected committee. Even if based on a local network,
it can naturally scale to national sizes, translating to those larger scales an effective accountabil-
ity typical of small-sized communities.
In this work, we analyze a new aspect that can be introduced in the original algorithm.
Specifically, we incorporate the possibility of a form of direct choice of individuals over the
possible elected representatives. Hence, we mitigate the aspect that voters determine their indi-
cations about whom they would like to see as their representative through opinions, valuing
the principle that individuals directly select candidates. This new ingredient is implemented by
introducing a declared preference among the contact network of individuals. Preferences act
as a weight on the original opinion-based ranking algorithm in such a way that higher rates
for these preferences are assigned to individuals considered more apt to participate in the
committee.
The described mechanism improves the legitimation, fairness, and effectiveness of the com-
mittee. In fact, overlaps, which are not controlled by voters, are weighted by a term subjectively
assigned by the individuals. This weight should encourage a check on incompetence and cor-
ruption: Incompetence because an equal say for every individual is not necessarily always
desired; Corruption as the preference should be proportional to the person who demonstrates
and promises true integrity (sound ethical principles and trust). As each voter knows their rep-
resentatives and each committee member knows whom he is accountable to, this fact allows
for a strong control over representatives’ actions.
The purpose of this work is to present and characterize in depth the new social algorithm
throughout computational analyses. In Sec. II we describe the details of the algorithm. Sec. III
is devoted to test the new voting rule, modeling the behavior of the selected committee. The
quality of the elected committee is assessed looking at how much their final decisions are con-
sistent with the community’s personal opinions and estimating the general integrity of the
elected committee. Finally, Sec. IV presents some discussions of our results and concluding
remarks.
The model
Let us assume a system composed by Ne electors interacting on an internet-based platform.
The platform allows the voters to declare who belongs to their interaction circle, rendering a
network of well-known individuals. Voters also declare their perception of integrity for each
individual k belonging to their interaction circle. This perception is condensed in a scalar
value Ijk 2 [0, 1], which represents the perception that individual j has about the integrity of
individual k.
In a following step, voters manifest their opinions on Ni issues. Issues are organized in ques-
tions which can be defined by a committee or by means of a self-organized process internal to
the community. The answers of each individual j are organized in a vector vj, composed by Ni
cells. Each cell assumes the value 1 for a positive answer, −1 for a negative one or 0 for a
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question left unanswered. Given the previous steps, the representative of a given individual j is
selected by means of the following algorithm.
The vector’s overlap of each individual j with all his neighbors k is computed through the
following expression [1]:
vj � vk ¼
PNi
m¼1ðv
j
m � v
k
mÞdðv
j
m; v
k
mÞ
PNi
m¼1 ðv
j
m � vkmÞ
2
; ð1Þ
where the numerator counts the number of questions answered in the same way (only yes or
not) and the denominator counts the number of questions answered simultaneously by both
individuals; δ stands for the Kronecker delta which is 1 if vjm ¼ v
k
m and 0 otherwise. Then, we
calculate the product of the previously defined overlap with the variable Ijk (i.e., the integrity of
k as perceived by j), obtaining the ranking function:
Rjk ¼ Ijk ðvj � vkÞ ð2Þ
The introduction of the term Ijk establishes a form of direct choice of the individual j over
the possible elected representative. Overlaps, which are not controlled by voters, are weighted
by a term subjectively assigned by the individuals. Notice that we are simply considering the
term Ijk associated to each agent k. Instead, we can consider a statistical measure over the social
circle of k to obtain a more precise evaluation of k’s integrity. However, this will introduce an
external interference in j’s choice which can be undesirable in a democratic process. Finally,
each individual j will indicate as his representative the individual k0 for which Rjk0 is maximum.
In the case where the same maximum value is shared by more than one individual, the one
with a higher connectivity is selected. For the exceptional case of equal connectivity, the repre-
sentative is randomly chosen between the equivalent ones. The introduction of the perception
of integrity and its use in the evaluation of the ranking function is the principal novelty of this
work in relation to the original algorithm of the voting rule introduced in [1].
After the selection of the representative k0 for every voter j, the final step consists of choos-
ing the aggregate of representatives for the entire community. To this end, we construct a
directed graph, which we call the representative graph, where a node represents each individ-
ual and a directed link connects the individual with his personal representative. In this graph,
which in general is composed by different disconnected clusters, cycles are present. These
cycles represent individuals that have been mutually indicated by themselves. Technically the
representative graph is a directed graph with out-degree 1. It is composed of disconnected
components, each one formed by a cycle with trees attached to the cycle nodes (see Fig 1).
Considering a transitivity process, votes flow through the trees until they get to the cycles.
Hence, the cycles’ individuals are proper potential representatives for the community.
As a final step, among the individuals belonging to a cycle, only the ones with a number of
votes larger than a threshold Θ are indicated as representatives. Votes are counted considering
the cumulative flow defined by the directed graph: If the individual j is pointing to z, z receives
all the votes previously received by j plus one. This flow of votes is computed only following
links outside the cycles. Inside the cycles, only the single vote of an individual is counted. To
sum up, the votes v received by an individual i inside a cycle are equal to:
vi ¼ 1þ
X
t2GðiÞ
lt ð3Þ
where G(i) is the set of all the trees ending at node i and lt is the number of links of the tree t.
Based on this score, the number of representatives is reduced and results in a fraction of the
total number of individuals that belongs to the cycles.
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Results and discussion
In our simulations, each individual is assigned an intrinsic integrity ik, which is a number uni-
formly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. The perceived integrity Ijk corresponds to ik shifted by
the error in the perception that j has on the integrity of individual k, which is modeled by a sca-
lar δij,k drawn from a Gaussian distribution N(0, σp). In order to keep Ijk 2 [0, 1], Ijk values
greater than 1 are set to 1 and negative values are set to 0: Ijk = max[min(ik + δij,k, 1), 0]. On the
other hand, the individuals’ opinions in relation to the selected issues are randomly generated
with the following rule: given an issue i, an individual does not have an opinion (vi = 0) with
probability 1/3. The probability to have an opinion vi = +1(−1), is 1/3 + �i (1/3 − �i), where �i
is a random variable following a normal distribution with mean value equal to zero and
σ2 = 0.05.
The interaction circles are modeled by generating a network where nodes represent indi-
viduals and links the social relationships present in the community. The interaction circle of
an individual is obtained selecting a node and considering its first neighbors. Note that an
important simplification of this approach is the fact that it generates individuals with symmet-
ric social relationships. In the following analysis three types of networks are considered.
Homogeneous random networks, implementing the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model [13], where the
degree distribution is peaked around a typical value hki; heterogeneous networks, using the
Baraba´si-Albert model [14], with a power-law degree distribution P(k)/ k−3; and the so-called
small-world Watts and Strogatz network model [15]. Our aim is not to model specific aspects
Fig 1. Schematic representation of the vote process. Nodes stand for the individuals; the red ones belong to a cycle
and will be confirmed as representatives if they collect more votes than the established threshold. The big numbers
associated to the nodes represent the received cumulated votes. Arrows stand for the indication of each individual and
the small numbers associated to them represent the number of transferred votes. Dotted arrows belong to a cycle
where there is no cumulative vote transfer. Figure extracted from Ref. [1].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g001
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of a real social network, but to use simple examples just to discuss the possible influence of
some relevant network properties on the behavior of our model (such as the heterogeneity in
the degree distribution, the average degree and the small-world property).
The system can be characterized by three observables:
• The normalized committee size, which is the ratio between the number of elected individuals
(E) and the total number of individuals of the community: F = E/Ne.
• The representativeness R, which is measured by calculating the fraction of decisions
expressed by the elected committee (ej) which matches with the community decisions (cj)
over all the considered Ni issues: R ¼
PNi
j¼1
dðej   cjÞ
Ni
. The committee’s decisions are attained by
means of a majority vote where each representative’s vote is weighted by the number of col-
lected votes during the election procedure. The community decision corresponds to the
result of a plebiscite, where every individual votes follow the opinion expressed in his vector
vj (no opinion corresponds to abstention). For R = 1 a perfect representativeness is obtained:
a committee makes all the decisions in line with the popular will. On the opposite, for binary
decisions, R = 1/2 corresponds to a non-representative committee, whose decisions are
completely uncorrelated to the popular will. A useful observable is 1 − R, which measures
how far the system is from the perfect representativeness. This quantity is particularly inter-
esting because, for the original model without integrity [1], it presents a simple and robust
relation with F:
1   R / 1=
ffiffiffi
F
p
ð4Þ
• The integrity I which is the mean value of the intrinsic integrity ik of the individuals selected
for the committee.
We perform our analysis varying the value of the threshold Θ, such as to obtain committees
of relatively small size but with a high representativeness level—close to 0.9—(see [1] for
details). In order to explore the relation between committee size and representativeness we
plot the representativeness versus the normalized committee size. As can be seen the logarith-
mic plot of 1 − R versus the normalized committee size, F (Fig 2), the introduction of the integ-
rity parameter has a marginal impact on relation 4. Only for higher values of F, which are
unpractical, a slightly worse representativeness in relation to the classical algorithm is per-
ceived. As for the classical algorithm, for fixed R, the normalized committee size increases with
the number of issues. The integrity behavior as a function of F has a quite simple response: it
shows very high values and a final abrupt drop for large committee size. This is due to the
probability for lower integrity individuals to obtain the necessary amount of votes to be elected
becoming relevant. The dependence on Ni is weak and establishes a trade-off between Repre-
sentativity and Integrity. More issues make the overlap less relevant in the computation of Rik
improving the integrity at the expenses of the representativity.
The dependence of the above observables with the system size Ne (Fig 3) shows that the lat-
ter has an impact on the representativeness but not on the integrity behavior. In fact, as it was
the case in the original model, when fixing R the committee size decreases for larger system
sizes. For example, for the parameters used in Fig 3, a representativity of 0.9 corresponds to a
committee of 78 members for a community of 2500 individuals, and to 36 representatives for
Ne = 40000. Furthermore, as can be seen in Fig 4, the error in integrity perception, which is
controlled by the parameter σp, has no effect on the representativeness. In contrast, it obviously
affects the committees’ integrity. The plateaux values of I decrease with σp, following a simple
Analyzing a networked social algorithm for collective selection of representative committees
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linear dependence on this parameter. Higher values of errors in the integrity perception corre-
spond linearly to worse values in the integrity selection (see inset in Fig 4).
In Fig 5, we can see that the representativeness is not strongly dependent on network con-
nectivity. For sufficiently high hki, the curves show the same behavior. The heterogeneity in
the degree distribution of the network marginally impacts the results. For high values of F, the
Fig 2. Top: On the left, logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized committee size for the NVR proposed in [1] (dark
blue) and the one proposed here (NVRI, light blue) with Ni = 40. On the right, 1 − R versus normalized committee size
for different Ni values. Bottom: Representativity (left) and Mean Committee Integrity (right) as a function of
normalized committee size. We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ne = 10000, hki = 40 and s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05.
Results are averaged over 100 different realizations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g002
Fig 3. Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized committee size (left). Mean Committee integrity as a function of
normalized committee size (right), for different numbers of electors Ne. We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ne =
10000, Ni = 40 and s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05. Results are averaged over 100 different realizations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g003
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Baraba´si-Albert network performs moderately worse than Erdo¨s-Re´nyi’s. As in the case of the
original algorithm, higher connectivity generates a small bias in the selection of the more rep-
resentative individuals. In contrast, the small world property of the Watts-Strogatz network
positively influences the algorithm, allowing for slightly better results in terms of representa-
tiveness. This last behavior is more pronounced than in the case of the original algorithm. We
Fig 4. Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized committee size (left). Mean Committee Integrity as a function of
normalized committee size (right). In the inset we show the linear behavior of IF=0.005 with σp (IF=0.005 = −0.34σp +
0.98). We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ne = 10000, Ni = 40, σ2 = 0.05 and hki = 40. Results are averaged over
100 different realizations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g004
Fig 5. Top: Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized committee size (left) and Mean Committee Integrity as a
function of normalized committee size (right) for different values of hki. Bottom: Logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus
normalized committee size (left) and Mean Committee Integrity as a function of normalized committee size (right) for
different network topologies. We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ni = 40, hki = 40 and s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05. Results
are averaged over 100 different realizations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g005
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have also analyzed the impact that the presence of community structure can have on the out-
come of the committee selection algorithm. We implemented the stochastic block model [16],
varying the intra- and inter-community link densities and the number of communities, and
we were not able to evidence relevant trends on the general results of our algorithm (see the
Supplementary Material for more details).
In addition to the so far discussed synthetic networks, we have tested our voting rule via
some data-driven simulations where real social networks are taken as an underlying structure
and the committee selection process is implemented on the top of these real networks. We
used collected data from the music streaming service Deezer, collected at November 2017 [17,
18]. This dataset represents the friendships networks of users from three European countries.
Nodes represent the users and edges are the mutual friendships. We used the data relative to
Croatia. They contain 54573 users and 498202 friendship relations, which correspond to
hki � 9, a reasonable mean connectivity. We also consider data from the free on-line social
network Orkut. Orkut allows users to form groups which external members can join. We used
data collected by Alan Mislove et al. [17, 19]; they contain 3072626 nodes and 11718083 edges
(hki � 38). In this two scenarios, we interpret the friendship relations as a social tie, which
renders a network of well-known individuals based on these real data. The integrity and the
opinion vector of each individual are synthetically generated following the previously imple-
mented rules. Finally we simulated the voting process on these real social networks, in which
the community elects a committee. Results, displayed in Fig 6, appear to be similar to the ones
obtained with synthetic networks.
In order to compare our model’s behavior with other traditional methods of representatives
selection, we analyze the representativeness and the integrity of equally sized committees. A
widespread method is a traditional majority voting rule (TMV) for electing representatives
in a closed list of previously determined candidates. In our implementation, a list of Nc
Fig 6. Top: On the left, logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus committee size. On the right, R versus committee size. Bottom:
Commitee Integrity as a function of R (left) and committee size (right). We consider the two social networks, Deezer
and Orkut. Results are averaged over 100 different realizations; s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g006
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candidates in the community is randomly selected and each individual j votes for the candidate
who presents the higher Rjk� value (k� belongs to the list of Nc candidates). Note that in this
case the integrity evaluation is influenced by errors in perception. Decisions are taken with the
same weighted voting rule. This modeling approach mimics a voter who has a perfect knowl-
edge of the candidates, assuming he makes a rational decision to maximize his representation.
For this voting rule, representativeness is also computed by comparing the decisions taken by
the committee, obtained with a weighted majority voting process, with the results of direct
popular vote. As can be appreciated in Fig 7, our model is by far more efficient, halving the
committees’ size and showing a better selection of representatives integrity.
Finally, we compare our method to an idealized perfect voting rule (PVR). This rule repre-
sents a situation of rational individuals that have a perfect knowledge of all others and their
opinions. Moreover, they are globally networked, having direct access to all others and allow-
ing their acts to be checked. In this situation, a voter indicates the individual with the highest
overlap with his opinion vector and the best integrity (the higher Rjk� value). Note that in this
case the evaluation of the integrity is not influenced by errors in perception. The selected com-
mittee is formed by the first F � Ne individuals which poll more. In this case, the committee
decisions are also taken as a weighted majority vote. This voting rule, although unrealistic, is
useful in at least two respects: First, very small communities can exhibit similar characteristics;
Second, the model is a useful yardstick for evaluating the levels of representativeness of more
realistic models. The relation between representativeness and committee sizes can be com-
pared also in the case of the PVR rule (see Fig 7). It is quite impressive that the representative-
ness of our networked voting rule is comparable with the perfect one. The PVR rule is able to
select a committee with a higher integrity score, but this is only possible because in this
Fig 7. Top: Representativity versus normalized committee size (left), logarithmic plot of 1 − R versus normalized
committee size (right). Bottom: Mean Committee integrity as a function of normalized committee size (left) and
Representativity (right). The results correspond to the Networked Voting Rule (NVRI), the Traditional Majority
Voting (TMV) and a Perfect Voting Rule (PVR) with parameters Ne = 10000, Ni = 40 and s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05. For the
NVRI we use a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with hki = 40. For the TVR we set the initial number of candidates Nc = 100.
Results are averaged over 100 different realizations. See the main text for a detailed explanation of the voting rules.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g007
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situation the integrity of every member is tested, and not only the integrity of a small subset, as
it happens for our networked rule.
We conclude our analysis testing the resilience of our networked voting rule to possible
attacks. We consider the situation in which a group of voters decides to assign high Ijk scores
to some individuals who, in contrast, are characterized by a low personal integrity. This behav-
ior can model patronage and clientelism relations, where individuals with low integrity orga-
nize a network of social relationships for obtaining political support. In our model this
behavior can be modeled introducing a percentage of individuals p for whom Ijk = 1 − Ijk. As
can be seen in Fig 8, representativeness is not seriously affected by this action. In contrast, the
integrity of the elected committee is strongly influenced by this ill behavior. By fixing the nor-
malized committee size F, the integrity undergoes an abrupt transition from high values
towards very low values as p increases, see Fig 9. Finally, we analyzed if the presence of individ-
uals who refuse to join the elected committee can impact our results. Even if 80% of the popu-
lation do not accept to be elected, results are substantially unaltered. Similarly, allowing
individuals to vote for themselves does not have a significant impact on our voting rule (see
the Supplementary Material for more details on these points).
Conclusion
We analyzed a new voting algorithm, particularly well suited for online social networks, for
selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of enhancing the participation of a
community both as electors and as representatives. This voting system is based on the idea of
transferring votes through a path over the social network (proxy-voting systems). Votes are
determined by an algorithm which weights the similarity of individuals opinions and the trust
between individuals directly connected in a specific social network.
Our computational analyses suggests that this voting algorithm can generate high repre-
sentativeness for relatively small committees characterized by a high level of integrity.
Results of representativeness and integrity are comparable with a theoretically defined per-
fect voting rule and, in general, perform better than a traditional voting rule with a closed
Fig 8. Representativity versus normalized committee size (left), Mean Committee integrity as a function of
normalized committee size (right) for different values of p (the percentage of individuals with a distorted
integrity perception). We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ne = 10000, hki = 40 and s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05. Results are
averaged over 100 different realizations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g008
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list of candidates. The introduction of a term which expresses the trust on the candidate’s
integrity does not significantly impact the representativeness of the committee, in particular
for committees of small and medium sizes. The rule shows a robust dependence on commu-
nity size. Besides, the perception of individual integrity directly influences the committee’s
quality: higher error values in the integrity perception linearly correspond to poorer values
in the committees’ integrity. On the other hand, representativeness is not strongly influenced
by integrity perception.
Interestingly enough, these findings are not strongly dependent on the general properties of
the network used to describe the community of voters, as shown by the analysis of networks
characterized by different topologies. Finally, the voting system seems robust to strategic and
untruthful application of the voting algorithm. In fact, even with a 20% of the votes produced
by individuals which vote for candidates with a low personal integrity, the integrity of the com-
mittee is substantially unaltered, and only if unfair votes are around 40% an abrupt change is
observed. In conclusion, we believe that the proposed voting rule, which fixes a particular way
for the voters to express their preferences and defines a clear algorithm for determining the
final identification of the committee, could be implemented in practice. If our results are con-
firmed in such hypothetical scenario, the algorithm discussed here will define an efficient form
of democracy by delegation based on proxy voting [12], which robustly shows a high level of
representativeness and integrity of the selected committee. These results are important
improvements over the original voting rule introduced in [1], as by incorporating the integrity
of individuals and its perception, we can address the important problem of the committee’s
trustability without compromising the high level of representativeness already shown by the
original algorithm.
Fig 9. Mean Committee Integrity for a normalized committee size F = 0.005 (IF=0.005) as a function of the
percentage of individuals with a distorted perception of the integrity (p). We consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with
Ne = 10000, hki = 40 and s2 ¼ s2p ¼ 0:05. Results are averaged over 100 different realizations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945.g009
Analyzing a networked social algorithm for collective selection of representative committees
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945 September 26, 2019 11 / 13
Supporting information
S1 Text. Supplementary Material: Analyzing a networked social algorithm for collective
selection of representative committees.
(PDF)
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Gabriel M. Lando for a critical reading which improved the readability
of our manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Alexis R. Herna´ndez, Carlos Gracia-La´zaro, Edgardo Brigatti, Yamir
Moreno.
Formal analysis: Alexis R. Herna´ndez, Carlos Gracia-La´zaro, Edgardo Brigatti, Yamir
Moreno.
Writing – original draft: Alexis R. Herna´ndez, Edgardo Brigatti.
Writing – review & editing: Alexis R. Herna´ndez, Carlos Gracia-La´zaro, Edgardo Brigatti,
Yamir Moreno.
References
1. Herna´ndez AR, Gracia-La´zaro C, Brigatti E, Moreno Y. 2018 A networked voting rule for democratic
representation. R. Soc. open sci. 5: 172265. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.172265 PMID: 29657817
2. Coleman Stephen, and Blumler Jay G. (2009) The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Prac-
tice and Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
3. Chadwick Andrew. (2006) Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies.
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Hindman Matthew Scott. (2009) The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
5. Condorcet MJ. 1785 Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilite´ des de´cisions rendues à la plura-
lite´ des voix. Paris, France: de l’Imprimerie royale. https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-3791
6. Katz R. S. Democracy and Elections. Oxford University Press, 1997.
7. Kelly J. 1991 Social Choice Bibliography. Soc Choice Welfare. 8, 97–169. http://www.jstor.org/stable/
41105976
8. Noveck Beth Simone. (2009) Wiki Government: How Technology Can Make Government Better,
Democracy Stronger, and Citizens More Powerful. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
9. Shane Peter M. (ed.). (2004) Democracy Online: The Prospects for Political Renewal Through the Inter-
net. New York, NY: Routledge.
10. M. A. Rodriguez et al., “Smartocracy: Social Networks for Collective Decision Making,” 2007 40th
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’07), Waikoloa, HI, 2007, pp. 90–
90.
11. Yamakawa H., Yoshida M., and Tsuchiya M. Toward delegated democracy: Vote by yourself, or trust
your network. International Journal of Human and Social Sciences, 1, 2007.
12. Paolo Boldi, Francesco Bonchi, Carlos Castillo, and Sebastiano Vigna. (2009) Voting in social net-
works. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Information and knowledge management
(CIKM’09). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 777–786; Paolo Boldi, Francesco Bonchi, Carlos Castillo,
Sebastiano Vigna Viscous Democracy For Social Networks, Communications of the ACM, 2011,
54,129–137
13. Erdo¨s P, Re´nyi A. 1960 On the evolution of random graphs. Publ. Math. Inst. Hung. Acad. Sci. 5:17–60.
14. Baraba´si AL, Albert R. 1999 Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. Science, 286, 509–512.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.286.5439.509 PMID: 10521342
Analyzing a networked social algorithm for collective selection of representative committees
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945 September 26, 2019 12 / 13
15. Watts DJ, Strogatz SH. 1998 Collective dynamics of “small–world” networks. Nature, 393, 440–442.
https://doi.org/10.1038/30918 PMID: 9623998
16. Holland P. W., Laskey K. B., Leinhardt S. (1983). Stochastic blockmodels: First steps. Social networks,
5(2), 109–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(83)90021-7
17. Jure Leskovec and Andrej Krevl. SNAP Datasets: Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection. http://
snap.stanford.edu/data. 2014.
18. B. Rozemberczki, R. Davies, R. Sarkar and C. Sutton. GEMSEC: Graph Embedding with Self Cluster-
ing. arXiv:1802.03997. 2018.
19. J. Yang and J. Leskovec. Defining and Evaluating Network Communities based on Ground-truth.
ICDM, arXiv:1205.6233. 2012.
Analyzing a networked social algorithm for collective selection of representative committees
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222945 September 26, 2019 13 / 13
